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JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review an order of the Utah Industrial
Commission pursuant to §35-1-86 Utah Code Ann.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal for review of an Order of the Utah Industrial Commission.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issues presented for review on appeal are as follows:
i.

Whether the Industrial Commission applied the proper
Standard when entertaining Applicant's Motion for Review and
on the Stipulation to Remand this matter for Review.
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ii.

Whether the Industrial Commission committed error by failing
to construe the workers' compensation statute liberally in favor
of the Applicant.

iii.

Whether the Industrial Commission's decision and order is
supported by adequate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.

iv.

Whether the Industrial Commission erred in finding that the
Applicant's medical condition was not work related.

v.

Whether the petitioner's due process rights have been denied
by virtue of the Commission's Findings of Fact or if the
Findings are arbitrarily capricious or wholly without cause.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
PAGE NO,

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45

5

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-86

5

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99

5

Utah Code Ann. §63-43b-12

4, 8, 9, \0

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12 states as follows:
(6)(c) The order on review shall contain:
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting or requiring
review;
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed;
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues reviewed;
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the issues reviewed;
(v) the reasons for the disposition;
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding officer or agency is to be affirmed,
reversed, or modified, and whether all or any portion of the adjudicative
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proceeding is to be remanded;
(vii) a notice of any right of further administrative reconsideration or judicial
review available to aggrieved parties; and
(viii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or review.

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-86 states as follows:
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review, reverse, or annul any order of the
commission, or to suspend or delay the operation or execution of any order.
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45 states as follows:
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured and the dependents of
each such employee who is liked, by accident arising out of and in the course of his
employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was not purposely selfinflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury or
death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and hospital services and medicines, and,
in case of death, such amount of funeral expenses, as provided in this chapter. The
responsibility for compensation and payment of medical nursing, and hospital services
and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall be on the
employer and its insurance carrier and not on the employee.
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99 states, in part as follows:
(1) If an employee claiming to have suffered an industrial accident in the service of
his employer fails to give written notice within 180 calendar days to his employer or
the commission of the time and place where the accident and injury occurred, and
of the nature of the accident and injury, the employee's claim for benefits under this
chapter is wholly barred.
STATEMENT OF CASE
On July 15,1991, the Petitioner was injured on the job while in the course and scope
of her employment. On December 31,1991, the Petitioner filed an Application for Hearing
for her Industrial Accident claim with the Industrial Commission. The petitioner claimed
that while she was lifting trays into the dishwasher at chest level, she developed sudden pain
in her shoulder. Petitioner asserts that her on-the-job activities, including washing dishes,
lifting trays and an increased workload led to an injury to her shoulder. Petitioner suffered
5

a Torn Rotator Cuff. Defendant responded that Petitioner's medical condition is directly
attributable to a pre-existing arthritic condition not attributable to an industrial accident or
disease.
A hearing was held on June 12, 1992. After hearing testimony and receiving a
medical exhibit, the Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter ALJ) took the matter under
advisement. Several letters were sent to the ALJ requesting a decision. On November 20,
1992, (or 162 days post hearing) the Administrative Law Judge entered his Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order. The ALJ found that applicant had prior problems with her
right arm and shoulder. The ALJ also found that applicant knew the workers compensation
system very well having prior industrially related injuries, ie cut finger and back. That the
applicant was released to return to work on November 4,1991. The applicant admitted she
told her supervisor she suffers from arthritis. The ALJ found the applicant and her
witnesses were not credible witnesses and that the defense witnesses were more credible.
Based on these findings, the ALJ found that there is no connection between the applicant's
shoulder problem and the alleged industrial accident.
The applicant filed a Motion for Review and Request for Hearing on December 21,
1992. The Industrial Commission entered it's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
indicating there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's findings on
credibility. That there is evidence that applicant complained of shoulder and arm pain on
July 15,1991 and left work to seek medical attention. That the applicant suffered symptoms
prior to the alleged incident of July 15, 1991. That the incident was not immediately
reported to the employer and that applicant's treating physician attributed her complaints
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to a recurrent condition for which she sought treatment.
The Petitioner appealed this matter to the Court of Appeals. By Petitioner's Motion
and Stipulation, the matter was remanded back to the Industrial Commission. The basis for
the Remand is that all parties agreed that the Industrial Commission applied the wrong
standard for determining Findings of Facts. The Industrial Commission must use the
"preponderance of evidence" standard when entering it's Findings of Fact.
On November 30, 1993, the Industrial Commission entered it's Order on Remand
utilizing the exact same language in the prior Order Denying Motion for Review, except it
inserts the following language:
We will only overturn an ALJ'sfindingsof fact if there is a compelling reason
to do so, especially when the factual issues turn on questions of witness
credibility. In this case, we find no compelling reason to overrule the ALJ's
findings of fact and conclusions of law are well supported by a preponderance
of the evidence in the record and hereby adopt them as our own. (emphasis
added)
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The Applicant asserts she is entitled to workers compensation benefits for having
suffered an industrial injury on July 15, 1991 while in the course and scope of her
employment. With an increase in work load, Applicant was lifting trays chest high to a
dishwasher. She immediately felt a sharp shoulder pain, sufficient enough to cause her to
cry. Immediately following the incident, she confronted her supervisor, Greg Coburn, and
indicated she needed medical attention. In the hearing, Mr. Cobum testified that she was
in pain, that she was crying, and that she was on the job when she confronted him. See
pages 123,130 of Transcript. Mr. Coburn further testified the applicant needed immediate
medical attention.
7

Another witness and employee of defendant, Penny Manchester, also saw applicant
in tears on the day of the accident and verified she needed medical treatment. An accident
report regarding the industrial injury was filled out by a supervisor on July 15, 1991.
Applicant was immediately treated for her injury by Dr. David Curtis, a physician
who is employed by Defendant. In his chart note August 8, 1991, Dr. Curtis indicates that
applicant reported that the injury was industrially related. Dr. Curtis did not fill out a
Physicians Report of Injury even though he was apprised that the medical condition was
industrially related.
An arthrogram was performed after the injury and found that she had a torn rotator
cuff. Surgery was performed 14 days following the injury and the findings showed "an
obvious large tear of the rotator cuff'. No prior medical report manifests a torn rotator cuff.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Industrial Commission mis-applied the standard for review when entering it's
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order denying Motion for Review. The Industrial
Commission must apply Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12 for the Motion for Review. It
indicates that the Industrial Commission order shall contain the following:
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting or requiring
review;
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed;
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues reviewed;
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the issues reviewed;
(v) the reasons for the disposition;
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding officer or agency is to be affirmed,
reversed, or modified, and whether all or any portion of the adjudicative
proceeding is to be remanded;
(vii) a notice of any right of further administrative reconsideration or judicial
review available to aggrieved parties; and
(viii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or review.
8

The Industrial Commission did not follow Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12. It misapplied the standard of review by not entering proper Findings of Facts and Conclusions of
Law for each issue, by not designating the statute or rule permitting review, by not
indicating the proper disposition of the case, and by disregarding substantial evidence
indicating a compensable accident occurred.
The Industrial Commission disregarded competent evidence in favor of unsubstantial
contradictory evidence in finding that Applicant did not suffer a compensable injury. The
Industrial Commission committed an error of law by when it placed too much emphasis on
"credibility" when it should have construed the benefits in favor of compensability. McPhie
v. Industrial Commission, 567 P.2d 153 (Utah 1977).
Applicant's due process rights have been violated. She is entitled to an ALJ who is
unbiased. Her due process rights have been violated when the AU's conduct prevented
meaningful and impartial consideration of the evidence. Bunnell v. Industrial Commission,
740 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1987). Anderson v. Industrial Commission. 696 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1985).
The Conclusions of Law are not supported by the facts. Neither the ALT nor the
Commission entered adequate Findings to base a meaningful review.

Finally, the

Commission and the ALJ did not construe the facts in favor of compensability. McPhie.
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
PROPER STANDARD FOR REVIEW
The Industrial Commission mis-applied the standard of review. The Industrial
Commission must enter it's own Findings of Fact. However, the Industrial Commission
erred when it used the exact same language as it's Order Denying Motion for Review and
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then substituted the new standard by stating:
We will only overturn an ALTs findings of fact if there is a compelling reason
to do so, especially when the factual issues turn on questions of witness
credibility. In this case, we find no compelling reason to overrule the ALTs
findings of fact and conclusions of law are well supported by a preponderance
of the evidence in the record and hereby adopt them as our own.
This case is similar to Ashcroft v. Industrial Commission. 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 50
(1993). In Ashcroft, the Industrial Commission employed the phrase "substantial evidence"
when reviewing the ALJ's decision. The Court of Appeals found in Ashcroft that "This is
not the correct standard".

That in order to prove compensability, the standard of

"preponderance of the evidence" must be used. Id. at 50.
There is a significant distinction between "preponderance of evidence" and
"substantial evidence" and is not one of mere phraseology. Id. Substantial evidence is "such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion".
Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Ct. App. 1989). The Ashcroft case was
remanded back to the Industrial Commission. This case should also be remanded as both
Mrs. Featherstone and the Court of Appeals are "entitled to know that the proof was
evaluated under the correct standard". Id. at 51.
The Industrial Commission now wants to include a new higher standard, that of
compelling evidence. Compelling is a higher standard than substantial, which the Industrial
Commission used previously. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, indicates that the Agency Order
must contain (iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues reviewed; and (iv) conclusions of
law as to each of the issues reviewed. In this case, the Administrative Agency did not enter
it's own Findings, but rather issued a new standard, that of whether there is a compelling
10

reason to overturn the ALPs findings.
THE FINDINGS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE
An administrative agency must make findings of fact and conclusions of law that are
adequately detailed so as to permit meaningful appellate review. Adams v. Board of Review,
173 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (1991). The failure of an agency to make adequate findings of fact
on material issues renders its findings "arbitrary and capricious". Nvrehn v. Industrial
Commission, 800 P.2d 300, 335 (Utah App. 1990) cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991).
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly described the detail required in administrative findings
in order to be considered adequate. See Adams at page 19. Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n. 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah 1986).
In this case, the Industrial Commission merely summarized the medical records by
stating that the injured employee "had a history of shoulder pain prior to July 15, 1991".
That Dr. Green attributed the rotator cuff injury to the July 15, 1991 industrial incident.
That Dr. Curtis made reference to "recurrent right shoulder pain" and "applicant believed
her injury was associated to 'more heavy work'".

The Industrial Commission then

summarized the testimony. Even though a summary may be helpful, the Adams court
specified that "A mere summary of the conflicting evidence in this case therefore does not
give a clear indication of the ALPs or the Commission's view as to what in fact occurred.
CREDIBILITY
Credibility has been a major source of concern at the Industrial Commission level.
The Commission must now realize that to merely decide a case based solely on credibility
does not meet Constitutional muster. How difficult it can be for the Court of Appeals to
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try to review orders of the Industrial Commission when the issues of fact are determined
solely on bald and unsubstantiated statements.

Ordinarily, the Commission and the

reviewing Court accord great deference to the Administrative Law Judge. The policy of
deference is predicated on the Judge's ability to personally observe the witness and evaluate
first hand his or her demeanor.
Although determination of a witness credibility is usually left to the discretion of the
finder of fact, that discretion is not unlimited and can be abused. However, said abuse
should be scrutinized carefully by this court. A judge is not at liberty, under the guise of
passing upon credibility of a witness, to disregard his testimony when from no reasonable
point of view is it open to doubt. Witnesses 81 Am Jur 2d §1034. Moreover, there is no
reason for a trier of fact to determine the credibility of the testimony of a party where it is
not contradicted by direct evidence, or by any legitimate inferences from the evidence, and
it is not opposed to the probabilities, or in its nature surprising or suspicious.
A standard for when credibility may be used at issue in Findings of Fact must be
made be determined by this Court. Credibility should not be at issue until there is
materially conflicting testimony and/or evidence. Materially conflicting evidence is such that
would affect the outcome of the matter. Immaterial conflicting evidence should not be the
basis for denying benefits. Moreover, if a materially conflict issue is raised, in order to
comply with Adams, the Industrial Commission must make adequate and complete
disclosure of why credibility is an issue, why the issue is material, determine the conflicting
evidence and how it resolves the issue.
In this case, the ALT chose insignificant, immaterial and irrelevant facts to illustrate
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his preconceived belief that the Applicant and all her witnesses lacked credibility. The A U
made the simple finding that "Considering all the foregoing, the Administrative Law Judge
finds that the applicant is not a credible witness". The A U justifies his summarizing
testimony that applicant told a supervisor that she had arthritis, that pain prevented her
from working, that she applied for unemployment benefits, that she knew the workers
compensation system well, that she had prior problems with her right arm and shoulder and
that she chose to retire. All of these determinations are immaterial. The A U completely
ignored material testimony and facts that 1) there was an increased workload, 2) that
applicant performed her duties well up to the date of the injury, 3) that her supervisor found
her in intense and immediate pain, 4) that her supervisor indicated she needed immediate
medical treatment, 5) that a co-worker verified an injury occurred and 6) there is now a torn
rotator cuff when previously there was not.
The Industrial Commission makes the following unsubstantiated bald statements in
order to justify denial of benefits:
The ALT determined that the applicant was not credible based upon
his observation of the witnesses and the inconsistencies between the
applicant's testimony and the evidence contained in the medical records. The
ALT further found that Penny Manchester added no factual support to the
applicant's case and that the applicant's husband was an antagonistic, biased
and argumentative witness who was neither credible nor reliable.
There is no support in the Order justifying the credibility, the observations or the
inconsistencies. Both the Applicant's witness, Penny Manchester, and the Defendant's
witness, Greg Coburn verified that on the day of the accident, they witnessed the Applicant
in pain, crying and in need of medical attention. This supports the fact that the Applicant
was injured on the job. The Industrial Commission finds on page three, that the applicant's
13

husband testified that his wife was in more pain after July 15,1991 than she was before and
she could clean or cook supper after the incident. The statements by the Industrial
Commission that the applicant's husband was antagonistic, biased and argumentative from
this Findings are unjustified and illogical.

Clearly, the statements by the Industrial

Commission do not comply with Adams as we do not have any basis for why it believes the
husband was antagonistic, biased and argumentative..
In Baker v. Industrial Commission, 405 P.2d 613 (Utah 1965) the Utah Supreme
Court had its first occasion to comment directly on the use of credibility determinations in
workers' compensation cases.

In that case, the Industrial Commission had denied

compensation, sustaining an Administrative Law Judge's denial of benefits on the basis of
the Applicant's alleged lack of credibility. The Suprepie Court in reversing, held in part as
follows:
We believe that the Commission as a fact finder acted as it did
because apparently it disbelieved uncontroverted testimony of
witnesses whose interest was in no way shown or inferable,
which carried a reasonable measure of conviction, and there
was noting in the record which intrinsically would discredit the
testimony or be indicative of witness demeanor that would give
the Commission an advantage over the Court in its
determination. The Commission's Order recited testimony of
the Applicant which seems to be taken out of context, without
considering the record as a whole.
We think that the critical question here is whether the
Commission arbitrarily can discount all competent,
uncontradicted evidence. We think it can't, but did so here,
calling for reversal.
There is no lack of evidence or anything in the record to reflect
incredibility on the part of the Applicant or her witnesses,
unless, on uncontroverted testimony we arbitrarily say six
persons, under penalty of perjury, were all prevaricators.
14

The Baker Court noted that the purpose of the Industrial Compensation Act was to
alleviate hardships upon workers and their families, and that the facts and inferences
therefrom constituting a worker's right to recover are to be liberally construed and went on
to hold that allegations of incredibility "must at least be supported by the record and by
accurate findings of fact". 615. See also McPhie. As in this case, there is no evidence in the
record to reflect incredibility on the part of the Applicant or her witnesses.
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS
In Adams v. Board of Review, 173 Utah Adv. Rep. 18. (1991) the Court of Appeals
found that "An administrative agency must make findings of fact and conclusions of law that
are adequately detailed so as to permit meaningful appellate review". The Court then cited
Nvrehn v. Industrial Commission. 800 P.2d 330 (Utah App. 1990) when it stated:
In order for us to meaningfully review the findings of the
Commission, the findings must be "sufficiently detailed and
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which
the ultimate conclusions on each factual issue was reached. The
failure of an agency to make adequate findings of fact on
material issues renders it findings "arbitrary and capricious".
There are two facets to determine whether there is a compensable injury. The first
is medical causation. Renowned Dr. Green indicated that her medical condition is related
to her employment. Dr. Curtis, the defendant's employee, indicates that applicant attributes
her condition to increase workload. The second facet is legal causation. Neither the ALT
nor the Commission analyzed this aspect in any depth. The failure to make adequate
findings renders the decision arbitraiy and capricious. Nvrehn. The Court of Appeals cannot
review the record meaningfully.
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CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals should remand this matter back to the
Industrial Commission for further hearing.
Dated this

day of April, 1994.

Davi<TW. Parker
Attorney for Appellant
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EXHIBIT A
FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No, 92-079
JENNIE M. FEATHERSTONE,
Applicant,

vs.
TOOELE VALLEY REGIONAL and/or
UTAH LOCAL GOVERNMENT TRUST
and/ EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE
FUND,
Defendants.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East 3 00 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on June
12, 1992 at 1:00 o'clock p.m.
Said hearing
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

The Honorable Donald L, George, Administrative Law
Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant, Jennie Featherstone, was present and
represented by David Parker, Attorney at Law.
The defendant employer, Tooele Valley Regional, and
its insurer, Utah Local Government Trust were
represented by David L. Church, Attorney at Law.
The Employers' Reinsurance Fund was represented by
its Administrator, Erie V. Boorman, Attorney at
Law.

An Application for Hearing requesting medical expenses,
permanent partial and temporary partial disability compensation,
interest, travel expenses and reserving the issue of permanent and
total disability was filed with the Industrial Commission of Utah
on December 31, 1991, wherein the applicant, Jennie M.
Featherstone, alleges that she sustained an injury by accident
arising out of or -in the course of her employment with the
defendant employer, Tooele Valley Regional, on July 15, 1991. That
Application was assigned case number 92-079, a copy was sent to the
defendant employer, an Answer thereto timely filed, and accordingly
the matter was scheduled for hearing before the Industrial
Commission of Utah on June 12, 1992.

JENNIE M. FEATHERSTONE
ORDER
PAGE TWO
Beyond the benefits applied for, the defendants7 position was
that no industrial accident had occurred, and in the alternative,
if an industrial accident were found, legal causation would have to
be overcome as well. Credibility was deemed to be a major issue.
The applicant testified that on the day of the alleged
industrial accident, July 15, 1991, she was working at her job as
a dishwasher for Tooele Valley Regional. She stated that she moved
12 trays (which are weighed at 1 pound 13 ounces each) and felt a
stabbing pain in her arm and shoulder.
Later when her supervisor, Greg came in, she was reportedly
crying, he asked what was wrong and she said she had to go to the
doctor.
Previous to this in April, 1991, the applicant had another
industrial accident where she picked up a tray of milk in a walk-in
freezer, hurt her low back, and reported that.
Dr. Curtis treated her for this July accident by telling her
to take a few days off. When she returned to work around the end
of October or the end of November, she asked for and was put on as
a "cold cook" but represented that she was not able to handle it
for more than 4 days because lifting above her head was necessary
and she couldn't do it. She stated that she could not return to
dishwashing because it was too hard on her arm.
On July 30, 1991, she reports surgery for a rotator cuff
repair, but still complained of pain after that procedure.
The applicant specifically stated that on the date of the
industrial accident, in addition to talking to supervisor, Greg,
she had also talked to her direct supervisor, Opal, about the
incident, but no report was filled out.
On cross-examination, the applicant acknowledged shoulder
problems prior to 1987.
She also at first did not recall an
appointment with Dr. Curtis for this condition on June 20, 1991,
then acknowledged that she did. As to her July 15, 1991, visit
with Dr. Curtis, the medical records do not show any notations
indicating an industrial accident.
The applicant acknowledged
filing out an industrial accident claim for the April, 1991,
incident, and stated that on July 15, 1991, no report was made out
because she was in too much pain.
The applicant admitted that her leg pain was what prevented
her from doing the "cold cook" job, not her shoulder.
The
applicant disagreed with Dr. Curtis' notes after the surgery which

JENNIE M. FEATHERSTONE
ORDER
PAGE THREE
indicated that she had full range of motion and good strength.
When she went to Dr. Greene for a second opinion, she stated that
he did not relate to her pain*
The applicant admitted knowing the reporting procedure,
because it had been explained to her and because she had done so on
the prior industrial accident.
In support of her application, the applicant called as a
second witness, Penny Manchester, who did not witness the
industrial accident, but said the applicant approached her on that
day, told the witness that her arm was hurting and asked Manchester
to work for her, to which she agreed. Manchester's testimony shed
no light, and appeared to be straining to support the applicant's
position.
The applicant presented her husband as her third and final
witness, who acknowledged that his wife had arthritis, and recited
a litany of worsened symptoms after the alleged industrial
accident. He was however, clearly biased, argumentative, exhibited
selective favorable recall, was angry with Dr. Curtis for allegedly
not turning in the industrial accident reporting paper work until
a month and a half after, thereby damaging the applicant's cause;
he also disagreed with Dr. Curtis of full range of motion.
The defendants presented as their first witness, insurance
adjuster, Marilyn Beesley, who had talked with the applicant on
August 7, 1991, when the applicant called Beesley about her denial
letter to Dr. Curtis on August 6th. In that conversation, the
applicant was requesting Beesley to reconsider her denial, and
stated that her shoulder was giving her the problem all along
[since the prior industrial accident]. There was no mention of
July 15th or this alleged second industrial accident. On crossexamination, Beesley stated that she investigated further, and no
report had been made to the employer by the applicant concerning
the July 15th incident•
The defendant's second witness was Greg Coburn, the director
of material management and food services who stated that he did
observe the applicant in tears and that she stated that she could
not work and left. No industrial accident was reported to him at
that time, and he was surprised when it was later turned in as an
industrial accident.
Coburn testified that contrary to the applicants statement
that she had reported this injury to Opal West on July 15th, which
was a Monday, Opal West did not work on Mondays, and when he
checked specifically as to the July 15th time sheet, West was off.
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Defendant's third witness was Diane Moore, who was the
applicant's direct supervisor on the date of the alleged injury.
She testified that the applicant did approach her around 9:30 or
10:00 a.m., and stated that she had to leave to go to the doctor
because her shoulder and arm ached. The applicant did not say
anything about an industrial accident at that time, and had
previously complained of shoulder pain, and taken time off.
On cross-examination, it was brought up that the applicant had
complained to Moore several times of her arm hurting because of
arthritis, but on August 29th, the applicant reported it as an
industrial accident.
Testimony ended.
Having reviewed the file, the exhibits, and further having had
an opportunity to observe the candor and demeanor of the witnesses,
the Administrative is now prepared to make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. The applicant had problems with her right arm and shoulder
long before the alleged industrial accident of July 15, 1991,
complained of it to the doctors, and received treatments which
included shots up to five years previous. The medical records on
page 101, dated May 22, 1991, indicate increasing shoulder pain.
That is followed on June 20, 1991, by the notation that the
applicant " . . . has complained of this over the past 3 years."
2.
The applicant knew the industrial accident reporting
system well, having done so previously on February 11, 1985, when
she cut her finger;
December 21, 1984, when she burned her
forearm; November 7, 1990, when she cut her finger on a pot, and
the last mentioned incident of April 16, 1991, where she allegedly
hurt her back.
Yet, when she claims to have an unwitnessed
industrial accident on July 15, 1991, by her own testimony, she did
not report to Greg. She did, however, claim that she reported it
to Opal, who was not even present on that day (to the detriment of
the applicant's credibility), further the applicant did not mention
an industrial accident in her visit to Dr. Curtis that same day,
nor did she follow through in reporting the matter at all until
August 29th or after, when she had been denied medical expenses.
3. The applicant was released to return to work on November
4, 1991, but chose to retire on 11/10/91, and admitted that her leg
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pain was what prevented her from doing the "cold cook" work, not
her shoulder. Further, on November 14, 1991, the applicant applied
for unemployment benefits, stating only that she had back and leg
pain, with no mention of her shoulder.
4.
The applicant admitted that she told supervisor Greg
Coburn that it was arthritis, and an x-ray report of July 18, 1991,
does show degenerative joint disease,
5.
Considering all the foregoing, the Administrative Law
Judge finds that the applicant is not a credible witness.
6. As to the applicant's second witness, Penny Manchester,
factually she added nothing, but was obviously attempting to
support the applicant's cause, but not convincingly.
7.
The applicant's husband was an antagonistic,, biased
witness on the applicant's behalf, argumentative, attacking Dr.
Curtis on various grounds, and having bursts of sudden favorable
recall. His testimony is neither credible nor reliable.
8. The ALJ finds the defense witnesses to be more credible
than those of the applicant.
Their testimony and the medical
records are clear that the applicant had previously existing
problems with her arm and shoulder, and when she left on the day of
the alleged industrial incident, she gave no indication whatsoever
that this was an industrial accident, and thereafter did not report
it as such for another 6 weeks.
9. There is no connection between the applicant's shoulder
problem and the alleged industrial accident of July 15, 1991, nor
with the applicant's prior industrial injury of April, 1991, nor
her low back problems.
10. The applicant was not involved in a compensable industrial
accident on July 15, 1991.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The applicant, Jennie M. Featherstone, has failed to show by
a preponderance of credible evidence that an industrial accident
occurred on July 15, 1991, and accordingly she is not entitled to
workers compensation benefits.
Good cause appearing herein, the Administrative Law Judge
hereby issues the following:
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ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claim of the applicant,
Jennie M. Featherstone, for medical expenses, temporary total
disability, temporary partial disability, permanent partial
disability, interest, travel and permanent total disability
benefits as a result of a July 15, 1991, incident, should be and
the same is hereby denied and dismissed with prejudice*
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (3 0) days of the
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not
subject to review or appeal*
INDUSTRIAL. COMMISSION OF UTAH

>£
Donald L. George
Administrative Law Judge
Certified this .^pirX)

day of

Wr**.

, 1992,

ATTEST:

Patricia O. Ashb;
taxv_^7
Commission Secret'

*NWkV>V

EXHIBIT B
MOTION FOR REVIEW

David W. Parker (5125)
Attorney for Applicant
180 South 300 West, Suite 260
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone No.: (801) 328-5600
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
JENNIE M. FEATHERSTONE
Plaintiff,
v.

) MOTION FOR REVIEW AND
) REQUEST FOR HEARING

TOOELE VALLEY REGIONAL and
UTAH LOCAL GOVERNMENT TRUST and
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND
I Case No.: 92-079
Defendant.
]
Applicant, by and through her attorney, David W. Parker,
hereby moves the Industrial Commission to review the decision of
the Administrative Law Judge rendered on November 20, 1992 in the
above-entitled matter.

The Applicant also moves that all matters

pertaining to the above case immediately be set for hearing before
the Industrial Commission. This Motion is brought on the following
basis:
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The

Applicant

asserts

she

is

entitled

to

workers

compensation benefits for having suffered an industrial injury on
July 15, 1991 while in the course and scope of her employment.
2.

Immediately following the incident, she confronted her

supervisor, one Greg Coburn and indicated she needed medical
attention.
3.

In the hearing, Mr. Coburn testified that she was in

pain, that she was crying, and that she was on the job when she
confronted him.

It was testified to by both Mr. Coburn and the

applicant that applicant needed immediate medical attention.
4.

Another

witness

and

employee

of

defendant,

Penny

Manchester, also saw applicant in tears on the day of the accident
and verified she needed medical treatment.
5.

An accident report regarding the industrial injury was

filled out by a supervisor on July 15, 1991.
6.

See exhibit A.

Applicant was immediately treated for her injury by Dr.

David Curtis, a physician who is also employed by Defendant.
7.
even

Dr. Curtis did not fill out a Physicians Report of Injury

though

he

was

apprised

that

the

medical

condition

was

industrially related.
8.

In his chart note August 8, 1991, Dr. Curtis indicates

that applicant reported that the injury was industrially related.
9.

An arthrogram was performed after the injury and found

that she had a torn rotator cuff.
10.

Surgery was performed 14 days following the injury and

the findings showed "an obvious large tear of the rotator cuff".
No prior medical report manifests a torn rotator cuff.
11.

Following the hearing, the Judge took the matter under

advisement.
12.

Because no decision was made after an extraordinary lapse

of time, numerous calls and letters were sent to Judge George.

The

requests concerned the rendering of a decision and whether he
needed any additional information to assist him in deciding the
case.

No

additional

information

Administrative Law Judge.
2

was

requested

by

the

13.

On November 20, 1992, or 162 days following the hearing,

Judge George issued his decision denying benefits based solely on
credibility.
ARGUMENT
CREDIBILITY
The Administrative Law Judge is considered the trier of fact
in these proceedings. The trier of fact can look at credibility of
witnesses only when credibility is in issue.
for having the

"There is no reason

(trier of fact) determine credibility of the

testimony of a party . . . where it is not contradicted by direct
evidence, or by any legitimate inferences from the evidence, and it
is not opposed to probabilities or in it's nature surprising or
suspicious."

81 Am. Jur. 2d Section 1035. The ALJ, in this case,

did not include any material rational behind his determination of
credibility

issues.

Moreover,

he

did

not

manifest

any

contradiction of direct evidence, showed any contrary inferences or
nature of suspicions.

Therefore, credibility cannot be at issue.

The ALJ cannot use his own personal subjectivity and opinion
about the applicant without taking into account all of the direct
and uncontroverted evidence.

"The trial judge, . . • is not at

liberty, under the guise of passing upon the credibility of a
witness to disregard his testimony when no reasonable point of view
is open to doubt."

81 Am Jur 2d 1034.

Moreover, the mere fact

that a witness is somehow involved in a case does not mean that his
testimony, ipso facto, must be disbelieved.

See Findings No. 7.

Rather, all of the testimony and direct evidence must be weighed.
3

See 81 Am Jur 2d 1031. Even though the trier of fact may be free
to disbelieve the testimony of an interest witness, it may not make
an affirmative finding that the exact opposite of his testimony is
true if there is no evidence to support such a finding.

See 81 Am

Jur 2d 1036 (Reminder).
The Administrative Law Judge's findings are clearly erroneous.
The

findings are neither

evidence.

supported

by testimony

nor medical

He also claims that the applicant is not a credible

witness, that the applicant's witnesses are not credible and that
the defense witnesses are more credible.
elicited

from

defendants

witnesses

and

Yet the Testimony
the

medical

records

corroborate applicant's claim. The judges decision making process
is non seguitur in nature.
of the evidence.

He has failed to adequately weigh all

The findings go against the clear weight of

evidence as required in Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (1989).
The findings have no merit and have no relationship to the material
issues of whether the applicant suffered a compensable injury.
Therefore, the findings must be set aside and a hearing must be
held in this matter for proper findings.
THE FINDINGS OF FACTS ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
The Administrative Law Judge findings were not supported by
the testimony.

Testimony by the applicant indicated that she

suffered an industrial injury while in the course and scope of her
employment.

Indeed,

she

testified

that

she was

loading

a

dishwasher with trays when she injured her shoulder. The accident
was an identifiable, unanticipated event.
4

She was subject to an

unreasonable

risk

not

associated

with

everyday

life.

The

supervisor also testified that immediately following the accident,
applicant reported the injury to him.

He observed the applicant

crying and in need of medical attention.

A fellow employe

testified she witnessed the applicant in pain and crying. Another
supervisor had filled out the accident report on the day in
question.

No testimony was elicited or documents produced to

indicate that the Applicant did not suffer an injury on the day in
question, nor any day thereafter.
The Administrative Law Judge's findings were not supported by
medical evidence. Prior to the accident, the applicant was treated
by Dr. Curtis.

Dr. Curtis' records shows she was seen for an

evaluation on January 14, 1988. Dr. Curtis expected her to regain
full function.

The next note specifies a "biceps rupture".

The

next note designates shoulder impingement (March 24, 1988).

The

chart note on June 16, 1988 manifests applicant is "getting along
well with her shoulder".

The last note prior to the industrial

injury asserts only that "Jennie presents for evaluation of her
shoulders".
prn".

Dr. Curtis states that "I will plan to see her back

On the day of the industrial injury, Dr. Curtis found pain

over the "anterior acromial region".

He then took her off work.

On July 19, 1991, an MRI was performed and found "There is a
prominently abnormal appearance of the supraspinatus muscle and
tendon in that there is increased signal, particularly on the T2
weighted images in the area of the distal supraspinatus tendon
consistent with a complete tear of the supraspinatus tendon with
5

retraction of the tendon noted" and "there is evidence of injury
and abnormality of the biceps tendon as well". The report clearly
asserts a new injury while recognizing degenerative and preexisting medical conditions.

14 days following the accident, an

arthrogram and arthroscopy was performed which found an "obvious
large tear of the rotator cuff.

No rotator cuff tear was ever

found previously.
THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CONTRARY TO LAW
By law, the findings are arbitrary and capricious.

The

administrative law judge did not follow the mandate of Adams v.
Board of Review, 173 Utah Adv. Rep 18, (1991). In Adams, the Court
of Appeals indicates that "The commission could not logically
conclude that Adam's medical condition, if any, was not caused by
her

employment

without

first

establishing

what

her

medical

condition was". In this case, the Administrative Law Judge did not
make any finding as to the medical condition. Because of such, the
Findings of Fact are defective.
The findings of fact issued by the Administrative Law Judge
are irrelevant and immaterial to the issues at hand.

Adams

requires that "An administrative agency must make findings of fact
and conclusions of law that are adequately detailed so as to permit
meaningful appellate review.

The failure of an agency to make

adequate findings of fact on material issues renders its findings
"arbitrary and capricious". The ALJ indicates in his findings that
the applicant chose to retire, that her husband was argumentative,
that she had arthritis, and that she applied for unemployment
6

benefits. All of these findings lend nothing to the issues at hand
about whether the applicant suffered a compensable industrial
accident and whether legal and medical causation has been proven.
APPLICANT HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICED BY THE ALJ'S DECISION
Applicant is seeking her exclusive remedy under workers'
compensation law.

She has no other remedy for the injuries that

she suffered while in the course and scope of her employment. The
Findings of Fact are defective, arbitrary and capricious. Because
of the ALJ's findings, the Applicant is substantially prejudiced
and cannot recover any workers7 compensation benefits. The denial
directly affects her ability to obtain lawful compensation and
medical treatment for her injuries.
The Administrative Law Judge unreasonably delayed rendering a
decision.

The hearing was set for June 12, 1992.

162 days

following the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge issued his
order.

The Administrative Law Judge did not need any additional

information, nor requested additional information from either
party.

Counsel

for

Applicant

repeatedly

contacted

the

Administrative Law Judge to render a decision. The ALJ was haunted
by the unreasonable delay and frequent and warranted requests for
decision.

This precipitated an impulsive and unsubstantiated

denial of applicant's benefits.
THE ORDER IS FLAWED
The Applicant

has a compensable

injury.

An

injury

is

compensable if the applicant can show that she is injured while in
the course and scope of her employment.
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The applicant testified,

which testimony was supported and uncontradicted, that she suffered
an on-the-job injury.

Dr. Curtis, a physician who is employed by

defendants, was notified of the injurY and treated her.

The

applicant reported to Dr. Curtis that the injury was industrially
related.

The medical records indicate that she did not suffer a

torn rotator cuff previously and that this is a new injury.

The

injury occurred within the course and scope of her employment as
attested to by all parties.
The applicant's prior medical problems do not relate to the
current medical problems.

The defendants assert that this case

should be decided under the Allen test. Allen should not apply in
that there has been no evidence produced by the defendants that the
applicant's prior medical problems contributed to or were related
to the current industrial injury.

The fact that there is a pre-

existing medical problem does not presume to invoke the Allen test.
Nvrehn v. Industrial Commission, 146 Utah Adv. Rpt. 53 (1990). The
Employer must prove medically that the claimant suffers from a preexisting condition which contributes to the injury at hand.
Nyrehn.

See

If the condition contributes to the injury at hand, an

aggravation of a pre-existing condition is compensable if applicant
can meet the higher standard set out by Allen.
However,
compensable.
benefits.

even
Allen

if

Allen

applied,

is not designed

the

injury

to deny

would

employees

be
from

It is designed to offset the pre-existing condition of

the employee as a likely cause of the injury, thereby eliminating
claims for impairments resulting from personal risk rather than
8

exertions at work.

You will note that much of the uncontroverted

testimony manifests that there was an unusually large amount of
work performed by the kitchen staff.

The applicant and kitchen

crew were burdened with additional work. This additional work was
caused by the Hospital taking on the contract to serve additional
meals for the jail inmates.

The applicant testified, which

testimony was uncontroverted and also supported by other witnesses,
that the injury was an unexpected cause of injury and unexpected
result of the exertion.

Claimant also testified, which testimony

was supported by other witnesses that her unusual exertion led to
her injury and should be compensable. She also testified that her
injury is the direct and natural result of her working activities
at Defendant's locale.

See Nyrehn.

The medical records support the industrial accident. Prior to
the

industrial accident, the applicant was being treated by

Defendants' employee, Dr. Curtis.

Dr. Curtis

found medical

conditions concerning the biceps and arthritic conditions.

Prior

to the industrial injury, he was not treating applicant for a torn
rotator cuff. The applicant needed medical treatment on the day of
the industrial accident. Following the accident, the doctor found
a torn rotator cuff.

Clearly, this is related to the accident in

question.
The Applicant reported the injury properly to the employer.
Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-1 et seq. requires only that the
employee notify the employer of the injury. Utah Code Ann. Section
35-1-99 requires that the injury must be reported within 180 days
9

of the date of accident.

If the employer files an "Employers

Report of Injury" then notice is considered proper and the statute
is tolled.

The supervisors all admit that they knew of injury

either the day of, or immediately following the accident.

The

Insurance adjustor admits that she knew of the injury within a
couple weeks of the accident. There is a document indicating that
the supervisor filled out an accident report the day of the
accident.

Therefore proper notice was given to the employer for

this accident.
CONCLUSION
The Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact are arbitrary
and capricious by law. The testimony and medical documents do not
substantiate a denial of workers compensation benefits.

They do

not justify a conclusion that no compensable injury occurred.

The

findings are based solely on a recitation of conflicting testimony.
In the Adams case, the Court of Appeals indicates that "a mere
summary of the conflicting evidence. . . does not give a clear
indication of the A.L.J, s or the Commission's view as to what in
fact occurred". The failure to have adequate findings of facts are
considered

arbitrary

and

capricious.

These

arbitrary

and

capricious findings substantially prejudiced the applicant in that
she

is

completely

Compensation Act.

denied

her

benefits

under

the

Workers

Any doubt respecting the right to compensation

must be resolved in Applicant's favor.

McPhie v. Industrial

Commission, 567 P.2d 153 (1977). Therefore, applicant's injury on
July 15, 1991 must be determined as compensable.
10

The Findings of

Fact as outlined by the Administrative Law Judge must be reversed
and this case must be remanded for further hearing.
Dated this

day of December, 1992.

David W. Parker
Attorney for Applicant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, hereby certify that I mailed, postage pre-paid, true and
correct copies of the foregoing document(s) this
day of
December, 1992,
TO:
Jennie M. Featherstone
428 East 300 North
Tooele Utah 84074
David L. Church, Esq.
51 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt lake City, Utah 84111
Erie V. Boorman, Esq.,
Administrator of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund
Industrial Commission of Utah
Adjudication Division
P.O. Box 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I, hereby certify that I hand-delivered, true and correct
copies of the foregoing document(s) this
day of December,
1992,
TO:
Industrial Commission of Utah
Adjudication Division
P.O. Box 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615
DAVID W. PARKER
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EXHIBIT C
ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR REVIEW

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Jennie M* Featherstone,

*
*

Applicant,
vs.

*
*
*

Tooele Valley Regional and/or
*
Utah Local Government Trust and *
Employers' Reinsurance Fund,
*

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW
Case No. 92000079

*

Respondents.

*

*********************************

The Industrial Commission of Utah issues this order pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-78 and Section 63-46b-12.
The applicant timely filed this motion for review of the
administrative law judge's ("ALJ") order dated November 20, 1992.
Said order denied the applicant's claim for workers' compensation
benefits pursuant to an alleged July 15, 1991 industrial accident.
The applicant asserts that the ALJ improperly based his
decision on credibility when the testimony of the applicant and her
witnesses was not contradicted by other witnesses or other evidence
in the record. She further asserts that the ALJ's findings of fact
are clearly erroneous and are not supported by the evidence in the
record.
Under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (flUAPAff) , an
ALJ's findings of fact will be sustained if the findings are
supported by "substantial evidence when viewed in light of the
whole record before the court." U.C.A. 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1992).
Substantial evidence is "more than a mere 'scintilla' of evidence
... though "something less than the weight of the evidence." Grace
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Ut. App. 1989)
quoting Consolo v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
In its
discussion of review of agency factfinding, the court noted that it
would "not substitute its judgment as between two reasonable
conflicting views," even if the court may have reached a different
conclusion had the matter come before them on de novo review.
Grace Drilling at 68.
We will apply the substantial evidence test to the ALJ's
findings of fact, recognizing that the ALJ was present at the
hearing and was better able to observe the testimony and demeanor
of the witnesses and to evaluate their credibility than the
commission on its review of the record. We have reviewed the tape
of the hearing in order to better assess the conformity of the
ALJ's findings with the taped testimony.
Review of the medical records exhibit shows that the applicant
had a history of shoulder pain prior to July 15, 1991, the date of
the alleged industrial accident. Medical Records Exhibit, pp.
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00027, 00033, 00045, 00053, 00056, 00058, 00101, 00118, 00119,
00122.
Dr. Mark Greene, however, opined that the applicants
rotator cuff injury which has been attributed to the alleged July
15, 1991 industrial accident, was different from the applicant's
1987 shoulder pain and bursitis.
Medical Records Exhibit, p.
00001.
The progress notes of Dr. David E. Curtis, the applicant's
treating physician, make reference to the applicant's "recurrent"
right shoulder pain.
Medical Records Exhibit, p. 00027.
Dr.
Curtis offered no opinion regarding the causal connection between
the applicant's rotator cuff tear and her employment, although he
did note that the applicant believed that her injury was associated
with "more heavy work at her dishwashing job, especially taking
care of the trays which come from the jail."
Medical Records
Exhibit, p. 00033. It is important to note that the applicant's
medical records indicate that she suffered the pain, popping and
grinding in her shoulder that she attributes to the industrial
accident before the alleged accident occurred. Medical Records
Exhibit, p. 00027.
At the hearing, the applicant testified that on July 15, 1991,
she picked up 12 serving trays to place them in the dishwasher and
felt extreme pain "like her arm was being pulled out of the
socket." She told Food Services Manager Greg Coburn that her arm
hurt and she needed to go see her doctor. Later that day, the
applicant saw her treating physician, Dr. Curtis.
Dr. Curtis
diagnosed a rotator cuff tear, but did not tell the applicant that
the injury predated the July 15, 1991 incident. With regard to
seeing Dr. Green for a second opinion, the applicant testified that
he told her that the 1991 rotator cuff injury was different from
her preceding shoulder problems. Dr. Green gave the applicant no
recommended course of treatment that she could recall, but she
testified that she "told him what she needed to have done and he
did it." Hearing Tape # 1 at 1275.
In addition, the applicant testified that she talked to Greg
and her supervisor, Opal West, on July 15, 1991 after the alleged
industrial accident. On cross examination, the applicant stated
that she believed she had been treated for arthritis in her
shoulder with cortisone shots prior to the accident. She testified
that prior to July 15, 1991, she suffered from severe shoulder
pain, popping and grinding. However, she didn't remember telling
Dr. Curtis about the pain, grinding and popping during her June 20,
1991 visit to the doctor. See Medical Records Exhibit at 00027.
The applicant further testified that when she suffered an
industrial injury to her low back in April 1991, she filled out an
accident report and reported to the emergency room per hospital
policy. On July 15, 1991, however, she claimed that her shoulder
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"hurt too much" and she didn't think about filling out an accident
report or going to the emergency room. Instead, she left work
early at about 9:00 a.m. to see her treating physician, Dr. Curtis.
The applicant stated that she initially thought her shoulder pain
was caused by arthritis, but later after she discovered there were
torn ligaments, she decided the injury must have resulted from
lifting the trays at work.
Penny Manchester, one of the applicant's co-workers, testified
that the applicant asked her to work for her on July 15, 1991. The
applicant appeared to be in a great deal of pain and was crying
when she asked Ms. Manchester to work for her. Ms. Manchester also
testified that Opal West was working on July 15, 1991.
Charles Featherstone, the applicant's husband of three years,
testified that before the alleged accident of July 15, 1991, the
applicant kept the house clean and always had supper ready when he
came home. After the accident, the house wasn't clean and supper
was "soup and sandwiches." Mr. Featherstone stated that his wife
seemed to be in more pain after July 15, 1991 than she was before
that date. He did not go with his wife to her June and July 1991
appointments with Dr. Curtis, so he did not know what the doctor
told her.
Marilyn Beesley, an insurance adjuster for the Utah Local
Government Trust, testified that she was the adjuster for the
applicant's April 16, 1991 lower back industrial claim.
She
received a request for approval of shoulder surgery to be charged
to the April 16, 1991 claim. Payment for the surgery was denied by
letter dated August 6, 1991 because there was nothing in her file
on the April 16, 1991 accident to support payment for the shoulder
surgery. The applicant called Ms. Beesley on August 7, 1991 to
request that she reconsider the denial of benefits. During this
conversation, the applicant did not mention a second accident in
July 1991. Ms. Beesley talked to the respondent in early August to
find out how the shoulder injury related to the accident in April
1991. The employer representative, Beth Bowles, indicated that she
did not know why the applicant had surgery. An employer's first
report of injury for the alleged July 15, 1991 accident was
received by the carrier on August 30, 1991.
Greg Coburn, the Director of Materials Management and Food
Services for the respondent testified that the applicant did not
tell him on July 15, 1991 that she had an industrial accident but
told him that her shoulder and arm hurt and she needed to leave.
The applicant had not mentioned her shoulder pain to him prior to
July 15, 1991. Mr. Coburn testified that Opal West was not working
on July 15, 1991. He stated that Opal regularly had Mondays off,
and that July 15, 1991 was a Monday. He also checked the work
schedule which showed that Opal was off that day and that Diane
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Moore was the supervisor on July 15, 1991. Mr. Coburn saw the
applicant on August 29, 1991 when she came in to file an employer's
first report of injury. On cross examination, Mr. Coburn stated
that he did not fill out an incident report on July 15, 1991
because the applicant did not tell him the injury was industrially
related.
Diane Moore, the applicant's supervisor on July 15, 1991
testified that she wasn't at work when the alleged accident
occurred, but came to work at about 9:00 a.m. that day.
The
applicant came to her and told her that her shoulder and arm ached
and she needed to go to the doctor. Prior to the date of the
accident Ms. Moore and the applicant had discussed the applicant's
shoulder pain which was attributed to arthritis. Ms. Moore further
testified that she didn't fill out an incident report because the
applicant did not say that she had suffered an industrial accident.
On August 29, 1991, Gary Coburn called Ms. Moore and told her to
help the applicant fill out an incident report for the alleged July
15, 1991 industrial accident.
We find that there is substantial evidence in the record to
support the ALJ's findings on the credibility of witnesses and the
compensability of the alleged industrial accident of July 15, 1991.
The evidence in the record shows that the applicant complained of
shoulder and arm pain on July 15, 1991 and left work to seek
medical attention.
Testimony of Jennie Featherstone, Penny
Manchester, Greg Coburn, Diane Moore.
The symptoms that the
applicant attributes to the industrial accident were present before
the alleged accident of July 15, 1991. Medical Records Exhibit, p.
00027. The accident was not immediately reported as industrially
caused and was not reported to the employer as an industrial
accident until the claim for benefits based upon the applicant's
April 16, 1991 industrial accident was denied. Testimony of Jennie
Featherstone, Greg Coburn, Diane Moore. There were no witnesses to
the alleged accident and the accident was not reported to any of
the applicant's co-workers. Testimony of Jennie Featherstone, Greg
Coburn, Diane Moore, Penny Manchester. The applicant's treating
physician attributed her complaints to a recurrent condition for
which she had previously sought treatment on June 20, 1991.
Medical Records Exhibit, p. 00027. Therefore, the evidence in the
record does not support a finding that the applicant was injured in
a compensable industrial accident on July 15, 1991.
ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the Order of the administrative law judge
dated November 30, 1992 is hereby affirmed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah
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Court of Appeals within 3 0 days of the date of this order, pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, 63-46b-16,
and Bonded Bicycle Couriers v. Dept. of Employment Security et a h ,
201 Utah Adv. Rep. 79. (CA, 12/04/92). The requesting party shall
bear all costs to prepare a transcript of the hearing for appeals
purposes.
Cv P\

Steph^h1 M. Ha
aan
Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner
Colleen S. Colton
Commissioner
Certified t h i s ^ ^ day of ^ W ^

jfa^^J) (frzpz>.

Patricia O. As
Commission Sec
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EXHIBIT D
MOTION TO REMAND
STIPULATION TO REMAND

DAVID W. PARKER (#5125)
Attorney for Claimant
Bank One Tower, Suite 900
50 West 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 328-5600
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JENNIE M. FEATHERSTONE
Claimant/Appellant,

]
)

MOTION TO REMAND

vs.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
'
UTAH TOOELE VALLEY REGIONAL '
(Employer) and/or UTAH LOCAL
)
GOVERNMENT TRUST and
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND ;
Defendants.
]

Case No. 930280-ca

The Claimant, by and through her attorney, David W. Parker, hereby moves the Utah
Court of Appeals to remand this matter back to the Industrial Commission pursuant to
Stipulation and Ashcroft v. Industrial Commission, 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (1993). In
support of Petitioner's Motion, enclosed is a Memorandum in Support of the Motion and
Stipulation, which has been signed by all parties, to remand this matter.
Dated this

/3

day of October, 1993. ^ ~

"^

David W. Parker
Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, hereby certify that I mailed, postage pre-paid, true and correct copies of the
foregoing document(s); Motion to Remand, Memorandum in Support of Appellant's Motion
to Remand matter to the Industrial Commission, and Stipulation this /%
day of
October, 1993,
TO:
Thomas C. Sturdy, Esq.
Sharon Eblem, Esq.
Industrial Commission of Utah
Adjudication Division
P.O. Box 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615
David Church, Esq.
51 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Erie V. Boorman, Esq.
Industrial Commission of Utah
Administrator of the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund
P.O. Box 146615
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DAVID W. PARKER (#5125)
Attorney for Claimant
Bank One Tower, Suite 900
50 West 300 South
Salt Lake City, Ut. 84101
Telephone: (801) 328-5600
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JENNIE M. FEATHERSTONE
Claimant,
STIPULATION TO REMAND
MATTER BACK TO INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION

vs.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
TOOELE VALLEY REGIONAL and/or
(Employer) UTAH LOCAL GOVERNMENT
TRUST and EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE
FUND
Defendants.

Appeal No.930280-ca

The Parties herein, each represented by counsel, do hereby
stipulate to remand this matter back to the Industrial Commission
for

appropriate review and

findings pursuant to Ashcroft v.

Industrial Commission, 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (1993).

Dated this

21

day of Augu

David W. Parker
Attorney for Claimant

Dated this £-\^

day of Augustl 199^.

f

David L. Church
Attorney for Defendants
Utah Local Government Trust and
Tooele Valley Regional

Dated this

day of August, 1993.

Erie V. Boorman
Attorney for Employers
Reinsurance Fund

Dated this

day of August, 1993.

Thomas C. Sturdy
Attorney for Industrial
Commission

EXHIBIT E
ORDER ON REMAND

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
P.O. Box 146600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600
Jennie M. Featherstone,

*
*

Applicant,
vs.

*
*
*

Tooele Valley Regional and/or
*
Utah Local Government Trust and *
Employers' Reinsurance Fund,
*

ORDER ON
REMAND
Case No. 92000079

*

Respondents.

*

*********************************

This matter was remanded to the Industrial Commission
("commission") by the Court of Appeals on October 28, 1993 for the
limited purpose of determining whether petitioner has shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to compensation.
The applicant filed a claim for workers 7 compensation benefits
based upon an alleged July 15, 1991 industrial accident.
An
administrative law judge of the commission ("ALJ") denied benefits
based in part on credibility determinations he made at the hearing.
We affirmed the ALJ's order based upon our determination that there
was substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's
findings of fact, conclusions of law and order.
The Court of
Appeals has held that we must apply the preponderance of the
evidence standard in our review of administrative law judge ("ALJ")
decisions*1
We will now review the evidence in the record to determine
whether the applicant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence
that she suffered a compensable industrial accident on July 15,
1993.
DISCUSSION:
Review of the medical records exhibit shows that the applicant
had a history of shoulder pain prior to July 15, 1991, the date of
the alleged industrial accident. Medical Records Exhibit, pp.
00027, 00033, 00045, 00053, 00056, 00058, 00101, 00118, 00119,
00122.
Dr. Mark Greene, however, opined that the applicant's
rotator cuff injury which has been attributed to the alleged July
15, 1991 industrial accident, was different from the applicant's
1987 shoulder pain and bursitis.
Medical Records Exhibit, p.
00001.
The progress notes of Dr. David E. Curtis, the applicant's
1

Ashcroft v. Industrial Commission, 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (Ut.
App. 1993).
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treating physician, make reference to the applicant's "recurrent"
right shoulder pain. Medical Records Exhibit, p. 00027.
Dr.
Curtis offered no opinion regarding the causal connection between
the applicant's rotator cuff tear and her employment, although he
did note that the applicant believed that her injury was associated
with "more heavy work at her dishwashing job, especially taking
care of the trays which come from the jail."
Medical Records
Exhibit, p. 00033. It is important to note that the applicant's
medical records indicate that she suffered the pain, popping and
grinding in her shoulder that she attributes to the industrial
accident before the alleged accident occurred. Medical Records
Exhibit, p. 00027.
At the hearing, the applicant testified that on July 15, 1991,
she picked up 12 serving trays to place them in the dishwasher and
felt extreme pain "like her arm was being pulled out of the
socket." She told Food Services Manager Greg Coburn that her arm
hurt and she needed to go see her doctor. Later that day, the
applicant saw her treating physician, Dr. Curtis.
Dr. Curtis
diagnosed a rotator cuff tear, but did not tell the applicant that
the injury predated the July 15, 1991 incident. With regard to
seeing Dr. Green for a second opinion, the applicant testified that
he told her that the 1991 rotator cuff injury was different from
her preceding shoulder problems. Dr. Green gave the applicant no
recommended course of treatment that she could recall, but she
testified that she "told him what she needed to have done and he
did it." Hearing Tape # 1 at 1275.
In addition, the applicant testified that she talked to Greg
and her supervisor, Opal West, on July 15, 1991 after the alleged
industrial accident. On cross examination, the applicant stated
that she believed she had been treated for arthritis in her
shoulder with cortisone shots prior to the accident. She testified
that prior to July 15, 1991, she suffered from severe shoulder
pain, popping and grinding. However, she didn't remember telling
Dr. Curtis about the pain, grinding and popping during her June 20,
1991 visit to the doctor. See Medical Records Exhibit at 00027.
The applicant further testified that when she suffered an
industrial injury to her low back in April 1991, she filled out an
accident report and reported to the emergency room per hospital
policy. On July 15, 1991, however, she claimed that her shoulder
"hurt too much" and she didn't think about filling out an accident
report or going to the emergency room. Instead, she left work
early at about 9:00 a.m. to see her treating physician, Dr. Curtis.
The applicant stated that she initially thought her shoulder pain
was caused by arthritis, but later after she discovered there were
torn ligaments, she decided the injury must have resulted from
lifting the trays at work.
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Diane Moore, the applicant's supervisor on July 15, 1991
testified that she wasn't at work when the alleged accident
occurred, but came to work at about 9:00 a.m. that day.
The
applicant came to her and told her that her shoulder and arm ached
and she needed to go to the doctor. Prior to the date of the
accident Ms. Moore and the applicant had discussed the applicant's
shoulder pain which was attributed to arthritis. Ms. Moore further
testified that she didn't fill out an incident report because the
applicant did not say that she had suffered an industrial accident.
On August 29, 1991, Gary Coburn called Ms. Moore and told her to
help the applicant fill out an incident report for the alleged July
15, 1991 industrial accident.
The ALJ determined that the applicant was not credible based
upon his observation of the witnesses and the inconsistencies
between the applicant's testimony and the evidence contained in the
medical records. The ALJ further found that Penny Manchester added
no factual support to the applicant's case and that the applicant's
husband was an antagonistic, biased and argumentative witness who
was neither credible nor reliable.

In Vali Convelescent

and Care Institutions

v. Div. of

Health

Care Financing,
797 P.2d 438 (Utah App. 1990) , the Court of Appeals
cited with approval an Idaho case dealing with credibility
determinations by a hearing officer of an administrative agency.
The Idaho court noted
where credibility is crucial and where firsthand exposure to the witnesses may strongly
affect the outcome, we think the Personnel
Commission should not override the hearing
officer's impressions unless it makes a cogent
explanation of its reasons for doing so. Such
an explanation is essential to meaningful
judicial review . . .
Dept.

of Health

1987) cited

& Welfare

in Vali

v. Sandoval,

742 P. 2d 992, 996 (Ct. App.

at 449.

We will only overturn an ALJ's findings of fact if there is a
compelling reason to do so, especially when the factual issues turn
on questions of witness credibility. In this case, we find no
compelling reason to overrule the ALJ's findings of fact.
We
therefore conclude that the ALJ's findings of fact and conclusions
of law are well supported by a preponderance of the evidence in the
record and hereby adopt them as our own.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
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For the reasons outlined above, we find that the applicant has
failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she injured
her right shoulder in a compensable industrial accident on July 15,
1991.
ORDER:
IT I S THEREFORE ORDERED t h a t t h e Order o f t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
law j u d g e d a t e d November 3 0 , 1992 i s p h ^ r e b y a f f i r m e d .
DATED THISN7ft
1993.

DAY OF NOVEMBER,

3tepheTn/M.

Hadlefy)

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner
£££*_

Colleen S. Colton
Commissioner
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